

THE SHADOW OF ISLAM IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT DISCOURSE OF ORIENTAL DESPOTISM

Research Directions from Nicolas Antoine Boulanger

Garry W. TROMPF

University of Sydney

Within the history of Orientalizing texts of Western literature and scholarship, it repays to reconsider the first European monograph on “Oriental Despotism,” by Nicolas Antoine Boulanger (1722–59). This article attempts to establish that Boulanger’s text, which is basically about how the world’s religions become distorted by the worship or over-veneration of monarchical rulers, usefully points backwards and forwards to the way modern Western thinkers (Isaac Newton, Charles de Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Georg Hegel, etc.) have connected Islam to rules by decadent potentates, and to oppressive political control and tyranny.

KEYWORDS: Religions Orientalism Despotism Islam Monarchy Nicolas Boulanger

The first European book devoted to “Oriental Despotism” was basically an early modern attempt to tell the problematic story of the world’s ancient religions, not a book on authoritarian governments in ‘the East.’ The posthumously and pseudonymously published *Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme orientales* (‘Researches on the Origins of Oriental Despotism’) (1761) was by Nicolas Antoine Boulanger (1722–59), more an engineer than philosopher, yet erudite and severely critical, who thought a whole “Anarchy” of one-man reigns had marred human history, to the point that it left the contemporary “world with the possibility of becoming as bad as when it first fell into the situation.” (Boulanger 1761: xxv; cf. Sadrin and Giroud 1996: 32–35, 37, 39–42). Cynical about human superstitions, Boulanger was hardly going to say that this condition was an outcome of Providence or deserved at the hands of God; but he did say, as we would expect from a typical soul of the Enlightenment, that it had all happened according to “human and natural principles,” and through the *mêlée* one could still detect the “progress of reason.” That progress, however, was not obviously showing itself in Antiquity, and not revealing itself in the East. It was even only deceptively evident in modern republics of the West, which were recognizably unstable; but improvement became exceptionally clear in the new “rational” and “true monarchies” consolidating in his beloved Europe (Boulanger 1761: 419, 423, 425–426). The key factor that

had been holding matters up was religion, but more specifically the political form it had been responsible for through world history, namely *despotism*, which was predominantly Oriental or Eastern in its manifestations, and a form to be avoided, together with its causes, at all costs in the West – in the name of “public reason” and “social progress” (426).

It was less important for Boulanger to probe the origins of religion than to demonstrate that the many religious teachings (*dogmes*) of the past have “corrupted” matters by the false imaginings or “phantoms” that reach their extreme in “the God Man,” or “God Monarch (*Dieu Monarque*)” (158, 206, 362, 366, cf. 29–38, 195) and “divine King” (*divin Roi*) (esp. 183). Whether divinized or not, single rulers have been so extolled that they can act like a god: the rule is essentially “theocratic,” since all government had its origin in religion (39–46, 100–143), with rulers always offering an utter “peace and felicity” (359) and each monarch cast in the role of a “Grand Judge” over all like a Divinity (361). To the classic images of Eastern world monarchies inherited in Western literature “of Assyria, of Persia, of Babylon” (not in the usual order) (373; cf. Rowley 1935), Boulanger adds Egypt, China, Japan, certain Greeks, Rome under the emperors (Boulanger 1761: e.g., 53, 143, 161) and the transference of this pattern from ancient “Asiatic courts” to the post-antique modern situation, through “many revolutions,” the Mongol dynastic control, for example, affecting the Persians and subsequently Europe (e.g., 357, 366, 376), and in fact with “all nations,” even as far as Siam (Thailand) now being infected by the fashion (210). The macroscopic picture left is that, over historical time, humans, “innocent about all human errors,” have fallen in need of strong leadership amid the ills of the world (29–38) being slowly (*peu à peu*) ... “captured by the ceremony” that increasingly surrounded their rulers, with undue authority granted to sacred officiants as preservers of the heaven’s orders (186–187, 195–196; cf. 1766). Boulanger describes the process as a *système* justifying itself (1761: 8, 141), perhaps being the first to use this term for a socio-religious configuration rather than just a system of government or of political oppression (Littré, vol. 7, 670; cf. Rousseau 1772), but he did assert that the system was never more consummately evident than in Rome’s “empire of the world” (Boulanger 1761: 143). Priests (sometimes “theologians”) are the main culprits in developing the imperial aura, manipulating symbols and allegories, multiplying supportive gods, legitimating authority by astrology, and pacifying peoples into a negligence of earlier institutions that were once in their hands, intensifying control under Eastern climates conducive to inactivity (esp. 196, 200n-200, 204n, 377). Despotism and religious ‘mystification’ go hand in hand as mutually reinforcing (Minuti 2012: 21).

Boulanger had his special axes to grind. He considered the Chinese had brought the combination of royalty and theocracy to “perfection,” but China’s “celestial monarch” for that reason was most patently despotic, since “despotism is just despotism,” and refining it made it worse. Only to the Chinese case does he devote a separate and detailed chapter (or *section*) (1761: 59, 160, 378–97, 425). This was in direct opposition to a widespread intellectual fashion at the time when, after increasing revelations of its culturo-political achievements, China was being admired for its order and stability, qualities extolled by Voltaire no less (esp. [1734] 1964: 53; [1764] 1802: 86; cf. also, e.g., Demel 1991: 52–54; Rowbotham 1932). A Deist, Boulanger also took aim at Christianity’s inheritance of the oriental despotic mode and its infection of European monarchies to forestall their rational progress. With its mixed background in the “original” apocalyptic Biblical idea of a return to Eden, Hebrew, and

Zoroastrian fears that God could destroy the world, common apparitions of a divine “Great Judge,” the promise to David of an everlasting terrestrial kingdom, Christians have proclaimed the ultimate God-King revealed as the Christ. And through Christianity’s adoption by Rome’s “universal monarchy,” Christian nations of Europe are caught up the “barbaric idea” of “sacred royal blood” and have accepted degenerate (Jewish, Sabaeen, and pagan) patterns of court ceremonial over worthier institutions they used to have (Boulanger 1761: 4, 63, 67, 141, 171, 174–178, 180–183, 188, 196, 201–213, 218–219, 361; cf. 1794). This charge flew in the face, for a start, of tendencies to sacralise the *ancien regime* and he was questioning the French monarchy’s Providential role in history, for even the otherwise ironical Voltaire rated the Age of Louis as one of the greatest ever, while French clerics worked with the “impenetrable doctrine that “state and society” could best be kept ordered by bolstering royalty (xvi; cf. Voltaire [1751] 1926; 2; De Tocqueville [1835–40] 1966: 52–159).

Strange as it is, then, that the author of the first monograph focused on “oriental despotism” made very little of *Islamic* rulers. On Persia, Boulanger is preoccupied by the ancient empire, and only once does he allude to ‘Ali as exalted among God-kings, perhaps learning of the Shi’ite Safavid dynasty, resurgent in 1750s. And he has learnt from Moldavian Prince Dimitrie Cantemir’s history of the Ottomans (1743) that (Sunni) Turkish Sultans are taught they can execute up to 40 persons without sinning (Boulanger 1761: 210, 240n, cf. 357). But in truth rulership under Islam does not fit the major pattern he drew that “capricious and bizarre effects of the imagination” had produced varied mythologies for royal rules through “successive epochs,” except that “theocratic” ideas (certainly found in Islam) are key to producing despotisms over “all the Orient.” (146, 244–247). Boulanger is thus a good place to begin studying “Orientalist Enlightenment” discourse (omitted by Said [1978] 1995), because his attitudes toward despotic rule are not really forged from assessing the Muslim world at all, but from a much older strand of European thought that affects the so-called European Enlightenment, one that eventually gets linked in with what we may call ‘emerging Orientalist tendencies.’

The most long-standing strand of European thought-conditioning is usually sourced from Aristotle, who set aside “barbarian monarchy, that is, hereditary despotism (*despotikē*) [at least] conforming to law”), which he quickly bypasses as irrelevant to Greek constitutional life (*Politica* 1285b: 22–26). Most of his readers would immediately think of the Persian kings, whose striking failure to conquer Hellas revealed both the inferiority of their institutions and their susceptibility as immensely powerful to become tyrants (Herodotus, *Historiae* vii–viii; cf. Trompf 1979: 93–96). This is a primary fear Boulanger has of oriental despots, that they become tyrants (1761: 373), although it is a thread of political thought from Antiquity until the late Renaissance that *any* rule by a single will can turn into a tyranny (Polybius, *Historiae* vi, vii, 8.; Aquinas, *De Regimine principum* 3; Machiavelli, *Discorsi* I, 2), and what becomes the chief characteristics of oriental rulers over time is that they luxuriate, neglect manly discipline, and accentuate aspects of “the Potentate” (Florus, *Epitome* proem.; Vegetius, *Epitoma rei militaris* I, 1, 20, 28; Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* III, 21–23; Bodin, *Methodus* VI) and are also to be classified as “barbarian” (e.g., Le Roy, *Aristotles Politiques* iii, 10). In the Eastern Roman Empire the citizenry might have referred to the emperor endearingly as *despotēs* (Ensslin 1967: 2) but for many Western European authors despotism seemed to fit the case more negatively, since the Emperor (*Autocrator*) appeared to have excessive

power over the Patriarch(s) and their schismatic church (after *ca.* 1051), and was head over a decadent court (e.g., Gregory 2010: 2); and after the eventual subjection of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, and the ferocity of Mehmet II “the Conqueror,” the Sultanate seemed to slide into the same mould (e.g., Çirakman 2002: 61–84). In contending to replace the Second Rome, Russia’s claims to be a Third Rome (Czar = Caesar) and the consolidation of its court in the seventeenth century also produced a despotic image in the West (e.g., Harrington, *Prerogative* [1658] I, 1). In this line of discourse inherited by Boulanger, then, the ‘oriental-despotic’ the shared vision of worrying absolute power overshadows questions of religion and strong associations of Islam.

Another trajectory of thought, less reflected in Boulanger, was a plainly religious reaction to the Turkish military invasions of Eastern Europe, the more threatening after the Ottomans first brought proper muskets to the field of battle (1440s on). It is surprising, though, that so late Catholic Latins experiencing the Fall of Constantinople, would still refer to the Turks as “pagans” (Szücs 1972: 601–68; as well as “enemies of the Christian faith” see Barbaro, *Giornale 1453* [Cornet]: 50–56). As for Protestants, when leading Reformer Martin Luther evoked the twin perils of the Turks and a corrupted Papacy, his aim was to presage the Last Times, Gog, as the Turks, being the greatest external enemy of the Church, and Magog, the Popes, the insidious internal foe (cf. Rev. 20: 8; cf. Q. 21:96). Although Luther conceded Germany deserved the Muslims for their sins and that the Qur’an should be translated to expose its own “fables,” the only substantive thing he said about the great enemy (of relevance to our discussion), was that it was *tyrannical*, and associated with luxury and greed (Headley 1963: 245–251). The Reformer’s projections might seem just to feed continuing para-Enlightenment Protestant strands of apocalypticism into the seventeenth century (e.g., McGinn 1994: 231–245; Jabukowski-Tiessen et al., 1999; Arjana 2015:58–83), were it not for the fact that a paragon of Enlightened thought, his achievements so extolled by Voltaire (Trompf 2015:641–643), engaged in his own form of Puritan eschatology: Sir Isaac Newton (1643–1727).

Now, Newton was an irenicist, quietly seeking for a basic morality that bound the peoples of the world for peace, and finding one originating in Noah (in what the Jews listed as Noah’s seven precepts) (Talmud, Sanh. 56a-b). Newton was also an anti-Trinitarian, the Trinity reflecting the influence of pharaonic Egypt (via Athanasius), which had been the chief propagator of idolatry in Antiquity (Trompf 1991: 221), a view, interestingly, Boulanger also came to share (1761: 207–215). At a time when Christian Unitarianism was emergent, and important politically on Europe’s eastern frontier under the Transylvanian Dukes (Makkai and Szász 2002), Newton might have been expected to rank the Muslims among those (such as the followers of the Brahmins, Confucius, Pythagoras, etc.) whose beliefs reflected the Noachian moral truth of old, but all thought of this seems eschewed (Trompf 1991: 234). Actually, in the secret of his study, Newton penned his own manuscript ‘On the Original of Monarchies’ (ca. 1690), some 80 years before Boulanger, and had traced all government back to families who needed “Elders” and thus “Councils” to rule in a natural governance of several, upholding ancient (socio-religious) liberties that monarchies were always in danger of betraying and turning into tyrannies (in Manuel 1963: 198–221; cf. Buchwald and Mordecai 2012: 195–221). The implications of Islam were religiously that of infidelism (for many meaning atheism) at the time (Kenny 1996: 48), and politically associated with a tyranny

quite the opposite to the constitutional monarchy Newton helped secure in Britain's 1688 Revolution and also directly counter to the seventh of Noah which directed that for good social order "Councils must be set up for the keeping of these rules" (against idolatry, blasphemy, murder, fornication, theft, and for the care of animals) (in Manuel 1963: 382). He thus extolled the Biblical times when "there was no king in Israel" (Jud. 17: 6) (a "happy time" Boulanger [1776: 47] also later celebrated). It was left to Newton's friend bishop Humphrey Prideaux, however, more learned on Arabian affairs, to portray Muhammad as an imposter and his decrees treacherous, while at the same time admitting that, because the Eastern churches over-tinkered with doctrine and the West had allowed in too many sects, they both earned the effects of "Mohametan tyranny" ([1697] 1723: vii-ix, xi-xii). The Newtonian negatives rubbed off on Voltaire, significantly, over in France (1736), although there was some retraction after he read the first Western defence of Muhammad's valid prophethood (for eastern lands), published posthumously (Boulainvilliers 1730; cf. Voltaire [1773] 1835: 81-83).

Negativities from a religious point of view, however, could not expunge the fact that Muhammad had created a great political force, and it is not surprising constitutionalists interested in the first legislators of nations would count Muhammad among them, from Sir Thomas Smyth (*De Republica Anglorum* [1583] 10), who listed him with Moses (founding Israel), Lycurgus (Sparta), Solon (Athens) and Romulus (Rome). And there was Andrzej Modrevious, who, as defender of the sixteenth-century Polish constitution (*Republica Emendata* [1554] I, 2), had no compunction in contrasting it with ancient Assyria and Persia, Muslim Sultanates, and "most Christian kingdoms" (the same point Boulanger was to make). And later, did not diplomat Sir William Temple (1672: 103-107) concede that the loss of original liberties was incurred in the long history of all the great luxuriating princes – Cyrus, Alexander, the Caesars, the Moors, and the northern European Franks? But these, along with occasional acknowledgements of Arab contributions to teachings and culture, e.g., *Le Roy Interchangeable Course* (Englished 1694:125 to Condorcet 1795:145-56) or travellers' moments of astonishment (such as Cantemir 1743), were meagre praises in responses to the Islamic world leading up to and in the European Enlightenment (so-called). Jean-Jacque Rousseau, for example, might have deemed Muhammad's "political system" originally "based on sane views" and "well linked," but after the early Caliphate, the Arabs were really "conquered" back by those whom they had defeated, and Muslim polities grew too "prosperous" and "slack," and same competition religious and political powers as in "Christian states" produced "the most violent of earthly despotisms," especially in (Safavid) Persia in his time (Rousseau [1762] 1914: 329-30). The point seems adapted from Boulanger and the effects of sacred cults on kingships (Rousseau doing most among great thinkers to publicize him [e.g., (1770) 1953: 348), and the two concurred that despotisms did most damage to liberty. Why, before Rousseau began his *Social Contract* with the famous dictum: "Man is born free but is everywhere in chains" ([1762] 1914: 119), Boulanger's *Despotisme orientale*, published a year before, begins by pondering the extraordinary fact that so many people have "kissed their chains" under Asian despots (1761: 2), an inurement he believed reflects "the veritable march of slavery," with nations duped, liberty lost and both division and inequality generated (239, cf. 177, 413, 418). That Rousseau finishes *Le Contrat sociale* lamenting the dangers of *theocracie, superstitieux* and the susceptibility of Christians "to be slaves" by political authorities

([1762] 1914: 334, 338) only conforms the connection. Intriguingly, Boulanger has it in his tract on *Gouvernement* (1776: 50) that this “pernicious” enslaving process is “little by little” at work “secularizing” (*se seculariserent*) all “savage and barbarous peoples,” so that they are no longer where “the Creator” intended “to place” them, or in Rousseau’s terms they are no longer “natural.” And Boulanger’s *Recherches* might just as well have been submitted for the same prize hoped to be won by Rousseau (1755) on the origins of human inequality (but paradoxically from a monarchical rather than Rousseau’s Republican viewpoint).

Boulanger’s own inspiration derives from the great French jurisprudential work on *The Spirit of the Laws* (*L’Esprit des Lois*) (1748) by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), but who (at least in the case of the *Recherches*) is referenced obliquely at the end as the “sublime author” of the work on rational monarchy (1761: 427), presumably to avoid implicating him in a controversial opinion on religion. Montesquieu had a more measured view of human affairs. He did concede, though, that Society necessarily takes away people’s natural equality, but they can recover it by the protection of good laws ([1748] 1979: 245). He also made a stark distinction between moderate and despotic monarchical governments, and without deploying the phrase *despotisme orientale* and even while admitting “despotic princes” can arise anywhere (139), he takes despotism to be “naturalized, as it were” in Asia, deliberately excluding Russia (189; cf. 187–188; Whelan 2001: 619). He spent much time discussing China, hedging his bets by declaring her beginnings and early industriousness sound, but dynastic successions and revolutions increased, and in the end, she fell into “corruption, luxury, indolence and pleasure” (a classic ‘orientalizing’ ploy exaggerated by Boulanger) [1748] 1979: 231–232). Montesquieu’s examples of despotisms are mainly from “Mahometan countries,” however, and relying (as he had for China) on Catholic missionary reports at different courts, he has mixed views. He denies the principle of honour is present among them (as they are found in proper monarchical governments), and sees only an absence of civic virtue (that applies in Republics) because “all are slaves” under despotic monarchies, and with fear is the basis for obedience or action, despots hide behind (all-too corruptible) front-men or *vizirs* (viziers) and prefer, like the worst Roman emperors, to quell opposition by a cruel, vengeful shedding of blood for further security, like “savages” cutting down a whole tree to eat its fruits” (149–52; 185, 168, 216, 260; cf. Curtis 2009: 99). Boulanger has made general use of his insights, but Montesquieu had allowed that weaknesses in such political structures known in Turkey and Persia are made up for by the uniting power of religion (187) and such a positive assessment was disagreeable. Boulanger makes no mention of the utility of the Muslim tax (or *jizyah*) system on conquest (366) and he dared to qualify the great legalists’ accentuation of warm climate to explain slavery (Boulanger 1761: 12, 15, 58, 377; Montesquieu [1748] 1979: 190, 259–260, 389–407). Priestcraft is always Boulanger’s culprit in his broad *Recherches* and the religious *système* it produces persistently “captures” whole peoples (a position which reflects, after all, anti-clericalism as one noticeable aspect of the Enlightenment ethos (Palmer [1801] 1823: 205–206)).

Researching Boulanger on *despotisme orientale* is instructive for the history of European ideas, hardly for learning about Islam, but his work carries a strong general bias against tyranny (and irrational monarchy) that suited and reflects only one (albeit significant) strand of orientalisating thought. Montesquieu’s work, for all its superficiality, takes us more in the direction of more serious scholarship on the Muslim world, to be probed ably by Edward

Gibbon (Pocock 2005), since the Frenchman was widely read in Britain (Klimowsky 1927: 64–68; Shackleton 196: 40–41). One senses in Georg Hegel, that the stress on the “theocratically despotic,” absolute rule of the Chinese emperor ([1840] 1971:150, 182) might be a Boulangerian touch, mediated through the Prussian’s reading of Rousseau (Quadrio 2007); yet Hegel on the “terrors of Islam” seems more affected by the Protestant religious line of thought discussed earlier (Hegel [1840] 1971: 456). Boulanger’s thinking belongs and elaborates the kind of rhetorical ploys or “‘pellets’ of thought” that want to sharpen Western political traditions of liberty and oppressions of Asiatic autocrats. I think of Constantin Comte de Volney’s radical hatred of monarchies, for instance, especially Eastern ones in his *Ruines* (1791; Cherpack 1957: 65); in Lord Byron, for instance, defending the Greeks’ endeavours to re-create Hellas (from 1821) despite “the [Ottoman] tyrant” (Trompf 2021: 70), even the asides about “Oriental Despotism” by liberal John Stuart Mill, even in “On Liberty” of 1859 (Kirkfist 1996: 73–87). One senses that Karl Marx minimally mitigates the prolonged barb by talk of and “Asiatic mode of production” (e.g., [1858] 1973: 493), and at least constitutionalist Wilhelm Roscher allowed that a strongman-cum-Ottoman “solution” might be necessary if a democracy broke down too dramatically (1847: 451). But Boulanger’s kind of overall negativity, toward twinned ancient and modern phenomena, have seeped into Western ideological self-affirmation. With its attitudinal abettors, his position has conditioned such strong political reactions in contemporary political theory as those by Karl Wittfogel’s *Oriental Despotism* (1957) on patterns of total power, especially in China’s hydraulic society and Maoism, and Samuel Huntington’s representation (esp. 1996) of the Muslims as a civilization clashing with and quite alien to West. Because Boulanger also detects in the West itself problems of its own despotic governments and imperial enslavement, this opens the question as to how aware European Enlightenment intellectuals were of pernicious policies within their nations’ spheres of power; but that is another story to be pursued in its own right.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: Pre-Enlightenment authors are only referenced within the main text.

- Arjana, S., 2015, *Muslims in the Western Imagination*, OUP, Oxford.
- Boulanger, N., 1761, *Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme orientales*. [Geneva], n. pub.
 1766, *L’Aniquité dévoilée par ses usages*, 3 vols., Rey, Paris.
 1794, *Le Christianisme dévoilé*.
 1776, *Le Gouvernement*, n. pub., London.
- Boulainvilliers, H., 1730, *La Vie de Mahomet*, Humbert, Amsterdam.
- Buchwald, J. and Feingold M., 2013, *Newton and the Origin of Civilization*. Princeton, PUP, New York.
- Cantemir, D., 1743, *Histoire de l’empire ottoman*., 4 vols., Despilly, Paris.
- Cherpack, C., 1957, “Volney’s *Les Ruines* and the Age of Rhetoric,” *Studies in Philology* 54(1): 65–75.
- Çirakman, A., 2002, *From the “Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of Europe”*, Peter Lang, New York.
- Condorcet, J., 1795, *Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès*, Agasse, Paris.
- Curtis, M., 2009, *Orientalism and Islam*, CUP, Cambridge.

- Demel, W., 1991, "China in the Political Thought of Western and Eastern Europe 1570–1750" in *China and Europe* (ed. Thomas Lee), 45–64, Chinese UP, Hong Kong.
- Ensslin, W., 1967, "The Government and Administration of the Byzantine Empire" in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, pt. 2: 1–54, CUP, Cambridge.
- Gregor, T., 2010, *A History of Byzantium*, Blackwells, Oxford.
- Headley, J., 1963. *Luther's View of Church History*, Yale UP, New Haven.
- Hegel, G., (1840) 1971, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie Geschichte* (in *Samtliche Werke* [ed. Hermann Glockner], vol. 11), Frommen, Stuttgart.
- Huntington, S., 1996, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Simon and Schuster, New York.
- Jabikowski-Tiessen, M. et al. (eds.), *Jahrhundertwenden*, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen.
- Kenny Christopher, 1996, 'Theology and Natural Philosophy in Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth-Century Britain.' (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Leeds), Leeds.
- Kirfist, R., 1996, "J.S. Mill on Oriental Despotism," *Utilitas* 8(1): 73–87.
- Klimowsky, E. 1927, *Die englische Gewaltenteilungslehre bis zu Montesquieu*, Rothschild, Berlin.
- Littré, É., (1872) 1954, *Dictionnaire de la langue française*, 7 vols., Hachette, Paris.
- Makkai, L. and Zoltán, S. 2002, *History of Transylvania*, vol. 2, Atlantic Research, Boulder, CO.
- McGinn, B., 1994, *The Antichrist*, Harper, San Francisco.
- Manuel, F., 1963, *Isaac Newton Historian*, Belknap, Boston, Mass.
- Marx, K., 1973, *Grundrisse*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Minuti, R., 2012, "Oriental Despotism", *Ego: European History Online* (online: leg-ego.eu)
- Montesquieu, C., (1748) 1979, *L'Esprit des lois* (ed. Victor Goldschmidt), vol. 1, Flammarion, Paris.
- Palmer, E., (1801) 1823, *Principles of Nature*, Carlile, London.
- Pocock, J. 2005, *Barbarism and Religion*, vol. 4, CUP, Cambridge.
- Prideaux, H., (1697) 1723, *The True Nature of Imposture fully Displa'd in the Life of Mahomet*, Curill, London.
- Quadrio, P. 2007. 'Towards a Theory of Organic Relations' (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Sydney), Sydney.
- Roscher, W., 1847, "Umrisse zur Naturlehre der drei Staatsformen," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 7: 79–88, 322–85, 436–73.
- Rousseau, J., 1755, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inegalite parmi les hommes*, Michel, Amsterdam. (1762) 1914, *Le Contrat social* (ed. Georges Beaulavon), Rieder, Paris. (1770) 1953, *Confessions* (Trans John Cohen), Penguin, Harmondsworth. 1772, *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne*, vol. 1, n. pub., London.
- Rowbotham, A., 1932, "Voltaire, Sinophile" *PMLA* 4, 4 (1932): 1050–66.
- Rowley, H., 1935, *Darius the Mede and the Four World Empires in the Book of Daniel*, OUP, Oxford.
- Sadrin, P. and V. Giroud, 1996, "Nicolas Antoine Boulanger (1722–59)," *The Yale University Library Gazette* 71, 1–2: 32–42.
- Said, E., (1978) 1995, *Orientalism*, Penguin London.
- Shackleton, R., 1976, "The Impact of French Thought on Gibbon," *Daedalus* 105, 3: 37–48.
- Szücs, J., 1972, *Nemzet és történelem*, Gondolat, Budapest.
- Temple, W. 1672, *An Essay on the Original and Nature of Government*, n. pub., London.
- Tocqueville, A., 1966, *The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution* (trans. Stuart Gilbert), Collins, London.
- Trompf, G., 1979, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought*, vol. 1, UCP, Berkeley.
- 1991, "On Newtonian History" in *The Uses of Antiquity* (ed. Stephen Gaukroger), pp. 213–49. Dordrecht: Brill.
- 2015, "The Ararat Factor" in *Studies on Iran and the Caucasus* (eds. We Bläsing et al.), pp. 629–66, Brill, Leiden.

- 2021, “Η Ελλάδα Αναστήθηκε!” *Phronema* 36(1): 67–81.
- Volney, C., 1791, *Les Ruines*, Desenne, Paris.
- Voltaire, D., (1734) 1964, *Lettres philosophiques*, Garnier, Paris.
- (1736) 1753, *Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet le prophète*, Ledet, Amsterdam.
- (1751) 1926, *The Age de Louis XIV* (trans. Martyn Pollack), Dent, London.
- (1764) 1802, *The Philosophical Dictionary* (trans. Anon), Wynne and Scholey, London.
- (1775) 1835, *Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations*, vol. 1, Treuttel, Paris.
- Whelan, F., 2001, “Oriental Despotism: Antequil-Duperron’s Response to Montesquieu,” *History of Political Thought* 22(4): 619–47.
- Wittfogel, K., 1957. *Oriental Despotism*, Yale UP, New Haven.